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INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court upheld the use of race in academic
admissions at the end of last term', sparking new questions and dialogue on
the future of race-conscious admissions programs. Applicants to the
University of Michigan and the University of Michigan Law School (Law
School), respectively, challenged the race-conscious admissions programs
at each school.
In Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court determined the
undergraduate program, which awarded every underrepresented minority
applicant 20 out of 150 total points, was unconstitutional. 2 In Grutter v.
Bollinger, however, the Court determined the Law School program, which
required admissions officials to evaluate all information in each applicant's
file, including an applicant's race, was constitutional.3
Post-decision dialogue surely has, and will, focus on the Court's dual
holdings; race is an acceptable admissions criteria when its use is narrowly
tailored to meet the compelling interest of attaining a diverse student body,4
while unacceptable when its use is not narrowly tailored to achieve the
compelling interest of having a diverse student body.5 The general analysis
for the decisions was unsurprising; for the most part, the Court applied a
strict scrutiny analysis to each race-conscious admissions program and
found one was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling interest and one was
not. Even with that predictable analysis, the emotional nature of raceconscious admissions programs, as well as their status as political footballs
between liberals and conservatives, sparked a large amount of postdecision discussion.
In this article, I do not propose to dissect both the Grutter and Gratz
opinions or the trail of precedent leading to those opinions. Thus, I do not
analyze the entire body of race-conscious educational and employment
jurisprudence for its reasoning, theory, and accuracy. I also do not propose
to analyze the varying views of all nine justices or how the Grutter and
Gratz opinions compare with each other. Others, presumably academics
and scholars, will conduct those necessary constitutional discussions. I
propose to discuss what I believe will be an emerging, yet somewhat
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2001.
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I.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
3.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 343.
Id. at 343.
4.
5.
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275-76.
*
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overlooked, issue in equal protection law: the problems with Grutter's
apparent time limit on race-conscious admissions programs.
In Part II, I discuss Grutter's affirmation of the Law School program,
which can be initially viewed as strongly upholding the constitutionality of
race-conscious admissions programs. The Court determined attaining a
diverse student body was a compelling state interest, and the Law School's
review of race, alongside other factors, was narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest. I discuss how the Court championed the widespread benefits
of a diverse student body, which included racial, educational, civic, and
professional benefits that derive from a diverse student body. The Court's
positive discussion of diversity's benefits leads the reader to believe
diversity constitutes a longstanding, compelling state interest.
In Part III, I discuss how about a page of the Grutteropinion created a
number of self-contradicting, paradoxical statements that may lead to
emerging issues in equal protection law. Just when the reader believes
diversity will constitute a longstanding, compelling state interest, the Court
takes a strikingly different tone. I discuss how the Court appears to
establish a time limit on the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions
programs.
To do so, the Court incorrectly states the Fourteenth
Amendment's purpose, equal protection law's historical norm, and ignores
the current status of racial (in)equality in the United States today. I also
discuss how many of the Court's statements in that part of the opinion
contradict many earlier portions of the opinion, thereby leaving the Court
caught in a paradox.
II.

GRUTTER UPHOLDS A RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS PROGRAM

In Grutter, the Supreme Court reviewed the use of a race-conscious
admissions program for the first time in twenty-five years.7 Previously, in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the Court struck down a

6.
Two leading commentaries on Grutter and Gratz briefly discussed the potential
time limitation Grutter set on race-conscious admissions programs in mostly footnote text.

See Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and

Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 67-68 n.306 (2003); Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals
as PoliticalActs: Guardiansat the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARv. L. REV. 113,
180-81 n.263, n.265 (2003). Two of five commentaries in a leading symposium reviewing
Grutter and Gratz briefly mention the potential time limitation. See Lee C. Bollinger, A
Comment on Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1589, 1595 (2003); Jack
Greenberg, Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1610,
1620 (2003).
7.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 321 (2003).
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set-aside program wherein 16 out of 100 seats in a state medical school
class were reserved for members of certain minority groups. 8 Justice
Powell's plurality opinion had to speak for the "severely fragmented
Court," 9 which produced six opinions, none of which commanded a
majority of the Court.' 0 Justice Powell established the strict scrutiny test as
the standard for reviewing race-conscious admissions programs", wherein
a governmental racial classification must be narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling interest.1 2 Justice Powell concluded the medical school
program was not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling interest, but an
admissions program evaluating race as a selection criteria could be
constitutional if did not contain a set-aside program. 13 Powell rejected
remedying past discrimination as an acceptable compelling state interest for
the program, but approved a university's
use of race to further the
4
attainment of a diverse student body. 1

The Law School's admissions program focuses on academic ability
coupled with a flexible assessment of applicants' talents, experiences and
potential to contribute to the learning of those around them. 5 The program
aspires to achieve diversity in order to enrich everyone's education. 16 The
program does not restrict the types of diverse contributors, but it does
affirm the Law School's commitment to including racial and ethnic
minorities who were historically discriminated against. 7 The Law School
seeks to admit a critical mass (no set-aside exists) of underrepresented
minority students who will make unique contributions to the Law School's
character.' 8 The Court reviewed the Law School's admissions program

8.
Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 266 (1978)). Bakke
was the first alleged "reverse discrimination" case the Supreme Court heard on the merits.
John Hart Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REv. 5, 131
(1978). Prior to Bakke, the Supreme Court dismissed a white law school applicant's
challenge to the University of Washington's race-conscious admissions program as being
moot since by the time the applicant appealed to the Court he nearly had completed law
school based on the trial court's original decision ordering his admittance to the law school
(which the Washington Supreme Court overturned). Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974) (per curiam), vacating 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), remanded to 529 P.2d 438 (1974).
9.
Ely, supra note 8, at 13 1.
10.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
II.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
12.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
13.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-315, 321.
Id. at 311.
14.
15.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 315 (2003).
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
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under strict scrutiny and found it was narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling interest. 19
A.

DIVERSITY IS A COMPELLING INTEREST

The Court endorsed Justice Powell's view that student body diversity
is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university
admissions.2 0 The Court found the Law School's program survived strict

19.
Id. at 343.
20.
Id. at 343. The Grutter majority did not include or exclude remedying past
discrimination against racial minorities as a potential compelling state interest justifying the
Law School's program. Id. at 367 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Many commentators
believe remedying past discrimination justifies using race-conscious educational and
employment programs today. See Kenneth R. Davis, Undo Hardship: An Argument for
Affirmative Action as a Mandatory Remedy in Systemic Racial Discrimination Cases, 107
DICK. L. REV. 503, 569 (2003) (arguing for court-ordered affirmative action to remedy racial
discrimination shown through disparate impact or pattern and practice); see also GERTRUDE
EZORSKY, RACISM AND JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 1 (1991); MELVIN I.
UROFSKY, A CONFLICT OF RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 29

(1991); Jonathan Feldman, Review Essay: Race-Consciousness Versus Colorblindness in the
Selection of Civil Rights Leaders: Reflections upon Jack Greenberg's Crusadersin Courts,
84 CAL. REV. 151, 154 (1996) (arguing race-conscious measures are needed to erase the
lingering effects of past societal discrimination); Benjamin L. Hooks, Affirmative Action: A
Needed Remedy, 21 GA. L. REV. 1043, 1052-53 (1987); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the
Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Racism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV.
1043, 1043. The Court, however, has limited states and their subdivisions to taking
remedial action only when they possess evidence that their own spending practices are
exacerbating a pattern of prior discrimination, and they must identify that discrimination,
public or private, with some specificity before they may use race-conscious relief. City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 504 (1989). But see Concrete Works of
Colorado, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, Colorado, 540 U.S. __, 124 S. Ct. 556 (2003)
(Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (concluding Denver's use of a raceconscious contracting program was supported on only an inference of racial discrimination
and disregards Croson, thus, inviting speculation that Croson has effectively been
overruled). Besides diversity, other potential compelling state interests justifying raceconscious admissions programs are providing a quality education and providing equal
educational opportunities. Note, The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions
Programs in Public Elementary and Secondary Schools, 112 HARV. L. REV. 940, 952-53
(1999). Others argue race-conscious programs promote fairness and justice. Luke C. Harris
& Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of Preferential Treatment: A
Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate, I I HARV.
BLACKLETER J. 1, 4 (1994) (stating race-conscious programs promote fairness and
equality); Roy L. Brooks, The Affirmative Action Issue: Law, Policy, and Morality, 22
CONN. L. REV. 323, 359-62 (1990) (stating race-conscious programs make society more
just).
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scrutiny and ultimately held the Law School has a compelling interest in
attaining a diverse student body.2 2
The Court deferred to the Law School's decision that diversity is
essential to its educational mission.23 The Court's conclusion that the Law
School has a compelling interest in a diverse student body is informed by
its view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law
School's institutional mission, and good faith on the university's part in
achieving this goal is presumed unless a showing to the contrary is made.24
The Court focused on the Law School's goal of assembling a critical
mass of minority students and concluded it was properly founded on
diversity's educational benefits, not numerical racial balancing. The Law
School's interest was not to assure a specific percentage of minority
applicants were admitted in order to achieve numerical racial balancing.25
Instead, the Court found the Law School's critical mass of
underrepresented minorities is "defined by reference to the educational
benefits that diversity is designed to produce. 2 6
The Court found numerous longstanding benefits of a diverse student
body. First, the Court focused on the specific race-based benefits of
diversity.
It found a diverse student body promotes cross-racial
understanding, helps to break down stereotypes and enables students to
better understand persons of different races. 27
These benefits are
inextricably linked with race. Thus, race must be used in admissions
policies to ensure that racial diversity continues to exist. When that occurs,
these race-based benefits of racial diversity follow.
The Court also focused on the educational and employment benefits of
racial diversity. It found racial diversity promotes livelier, more spirited
classroom discussion, which promotes better learning outcomes.28 It also
found racial diversity prepares students for an increasingly diverse
29
workforce and society. Thus, it better prepares them to be professionals.

21.
For the record, I believe benign uses of racial classifications, such as those in
race-conscious admissions programs, should be evaluated under intermediate, not strict,
scrutiny. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 296 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 at 301-02 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
22.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
23.
Id.
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
26.
Id.
27.
Id. at 330.
28.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
29.
Id. at 330.
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American businesses and the United States military made it clear that the
skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only30 be
developed through exposure to diverse cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.
The Court also emphasized that universities, and especially law
schools, represent the training ground for a large number of America's
leaders. 3' Individuals with law degrees occupy many state governorships,
federal Senate and House of Representative positions,32 and, obviously,
most state and federal judicial positions. The Court emphasized the
importance of racial diversity in law schools to foster a diverse set of
leaders:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the
eyes of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to
leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of
our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the
openness and integrity of the educational institutions ....
[L]aw schools 'cannot be effective in isolation from the
individuals and institutions with which the law interacts.
Access to legal education (and thus the legal profession)
must be inclusive of talented and qualified individuals of
every race and ethnicity, so that all members of our
heterogeneous society may participate in the educational
institutions that provide the training and education
necessary to succeed in America.33
The Court concluded one's own, unique experience as a racial
minority in our society, where race still matters, is likely to affect an
individual's views.34
B.

RACE-CONSCIOUS PROGRAMS CAN BE NARROWLY TAILORED

The Court found the Law School's program survived strict scrutiny
and concluded: "When race-based action is necessary to further a
compelling governmental interest, such action does not violate the

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

id.
Id. at 332-33.
Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332-33 (2003).
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constitutional guarantee of equal protection so long as the narrowly
tailoring requirement is . . . satisfied. 35 Grutter was the Court's first
opportunity since Bakke to define the contours of the narrowly tailored
inquiry with respect to race-conscious university admissions programs.36
When drawing racial distinctions that are compelling state or federal
interests, the means chosen to accomplish the asserted purpose have to be
narrowly tailored. 37 In other words, a race-conscious admissions program
cannot utilize a set-aside, which requires a certain fixed number or
proportion of opportunities to be reserved for certain minority groups, 38 but
it may utilize race or ethnicity as a plus factor. 39 An admissions program
must be flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in
light of the particular qualifications of each applicant.4 °
The Court found the Law School program to be a narrowly tailored
plan,4 1 not an unconstitutional set-aside. The Court found the Law
School's goal of attaining a critical mass of underrepresented minority
students does not transform its program into a set-aside. 42 The Law School
does pay attention to the number of underrepresented minorities enrolled,
which in and of itself is constitutionally acceptable, particularly since the
number of underrepresented minorities in each class at the Law School
varied from 13.5 to 20.1 percent between 1993 and 2000. 4
The Court went on to explain that when a race-conscious admissions
program does not operate as a set-aside program, it does not completely
satisfy the requirement that individual consideration be given to each
applicant. 44 Specifically, it stated a flexible program that provides
individualized consideration for each applicant is paramount.45 Then, it
found the Law School engages in a highly individualized, holistic review of
each applicant's file that is flexible enough to consider all pertinent
elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each

35.
Id. at 327.
36.
Id. at 333.
37.
Id. (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996)).
38.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 at 496 (1989) (O'Connor, J.) (plurality opinion)).
39.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
266 at 315, 317 (1978) (Powell, J., plurality opinion)).
40.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334.
41.
Id.
42.
Id. at 335-36.
43.
Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 266, 323 (1978)
(Powell, J., plurality opinion)).
44.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336.
45.
Id. (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 n.52 (Powell, J., plurality opinion)).
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applicant.46 That individualized review ensures that all factors that may
contribute to student body diversity are meaningfully considered alongside
race.47 The Court reiterated that qualified underrepresented minority
students are likely to have experiences of particular importance to the Law
School's mission, and less likely to be admitted in meaningful numbers on
criteria that ignore those experiences.4 8
Finally, the Court stated narrow tailoring does not require exhausting
every conceivable race-neutral alternative to meet a compelling state
*
49
interest.
It does not require a university to choose between maintaining a
reputation for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational
opportunities to all races. 50 The Court did, however, state that narrow
tailoring does require serious, good faith consideration of workable raceneutral alternatives that will achieve the diversity sought. 5' The Court
found the Law School sufficiently considered race-neutral
alternatives
52
before adopting its race-conscious admissions program.
III.

GRUTTER'S TIME LIMIT FOR RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS
PROGRAMS

After concluding the Law School's admissions program was
constitutional, the Court's opinion took an abrupt and puzzling turn.
Instead of concluding with a final sentence or paragraph, the Court inserted
a page of paradoxical and incorrect reasoning before its conclusion.

Despite its holding, the Court announced that all race-conscious admissions
programs must be limited in time.5 3
The Court's time limitation
requirement contradicts its conclusion that diversity is a compelling state
interest since diversity is a non-time sensitive interest. Since race-based
benefits create the compelling interest, then utilizing race to achieve racial
diversity would be a narrowly tailored means to reach diversity. To find
authority for this conclusion, the Court inaccurately stated the Fourteenth
Amendment's purpose.
The Court also contradicted itself when it
incorrectly characterized the historical norm of equal protection law to

46.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
47.
Id. at 337.
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
50.
Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509-10 (1989)).
51.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339 (citing J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 507).
52.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
53.
Id. at 342.
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provide colorblindness. This creates another paradox in the opinion since
the Court admits historical context matters when evaluating a raceconscious program, thus, a termination requirement cannot be accurate as it
would eliminate evaluating the context of a race-conscious program after
the termination point. Finally, the Court expects race-conscious programs
to be unnecessary in twenty-five years, a time period that is based on
nothing more than duplicating the time period between its decision and the
Bakke decision.
A.

DIVERSITY IS A CONTINUAL COMPELLING INTEREST

The Court's assertion that race-conscious admissions programs must
end does not match the first prong of strict scrutiny review; will a
compelling interest exist in the future, specifically in twenty-five years,
justifying race-conscious admissions programs? The Court's conclusion
that diversity constitutes a compelling interest sets a non-time sensitive
compelling interest that contradicts its requirement that race-conscious
admissions programs must eventually end. Specifically, the Court stated:
[R]acial classifications, however compelling their goals,
are potentially so dangerous that they may be employed no
more broadly than the interest demands. Enshrining a
permanent justification for racial preferences would offend
this fundamental equal protection principle.54
The Court's reasoning establishes that race-conscious admissions
programs should be limited in time if such limitations correspond to the
interest the program serves. 55 The compelling interest for the raceconscious admissions program in Grutter is diversity. 56 One commentator
went as far as to suggest that the Court's reasoning has conclusively settled
the issue of whether diversity is a compelling interest. 57 To examine if a
time limit for race-conscious admissions programs is appropriate or not,
therefore, we must determine if diversity is a time-sensitive compelling
interest. If it is, then race-conscious admissions programs could be
required to terminate once diversity no longer constitutes a compelling

54.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).
55.
Post, supra note 6, at 67 n.306.
56.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
57.
Pamela Karlan, Comments at the Harvard University Civil Rights Project (July
16, 2003) cited in Guinier, supra note 6, at 181 n.263.
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interest. On the other hand, if diversity is not a time-sensitive compelling
interest, then it will continue to be a compelling interest in the future
thereby preventing setting an end point for race-conscious admissions
programs.
In fact, diversity has no built-in time horizon: if diversity is necessary
for the quality of education now, it is necessary at all times.58 Grutter's
justifications for diversity are similarly non-time sensitive.5 9 As Robert
Post explained:
If diversity is necessary in order to train competent
professionals, for example, it is necessary at any and all
times; there is no intrinsic time horizon when this need for
diversity will disappear. The time-limitation requirement
announced by Grutter, therefore, makes theoretical sense
only if the justification for diversity that it announces are
taken to be quasi-remedial. 60
Specifically, the Court found three main benefits of diversity, 6I all of
which are continuous benefits that cannot be subjected to a time limitation.
Since Grutter points to the particular and unique values of racial
diversity, 62 which are not time-sensitive, evaluation of race cannot have a
termination point since diversity is an accepted, continual compelling
interest.
First, the Court found that a diverse student body promotes crossracial understanding, helps to break down stereotypes and enables students
to better understand persons of different races. 63 One commentator
summarized these diversity-based benefits:
Integration makes citizens more tolerant of other races and
more sensitive to the issues important to . . . other races.
Moreover, the formation and maintenance of interracial
social networks has a significant positive effect on
occupational attainment for minorities .... [T]he benefits

58.

Post, supra note 6, at 67 n.306 (citing Robert Post, Introduction: After Bakke,

in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 19-20 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin

eds., 1998)).
59.
Post, supra note 6, at 67 n.306.
60.
Id.
61.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
62.
Post, supra note 6, at 70.
63.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
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are perhaps even greater for white students, who are able to
learn about and interact with students of different
cultures. 64
Since the United States still contains many defacto racially segregated
communities, 65 ensuring racial diversity exists at universities will continue
into the future to promote cross-racial understanding and to break-down
stereotypes of races that other races have little or no contact with in their
communities.6 6 Racial segregation is not likely to end any time soon.67
Even if it does end, that does not mean that promoting cross-racial
understanding and breaking down racial stereotypes, two widely accepted
goals, will no longer be a compelling interest, particularly in light of the
tragic history of racial discrimination and segregation in the United States.
Next, sometime after 2050, no one racial group will constitute a majority in
the United States. 68 In twenty-five years, therefore, American Society will
be more racially diverse, yet likely still segregated. In twenty-five years,
promoting cross-racial understanding and breaking down racial stereotypes
will thus be even more of a compelling interest.
Second, the Court emphasized that diverse universities promote better
learning outcomes and prepare students for an increasingly diverse work
force and society. 69 This is true because a fundamental goal of education is
to help students expand their capacities to imagine other ways of
experiencing life and of seeing the world.7 ° One way to develop this
mentality is by placing students around people who are in some ways
different from them, or who they perceive to be different.7' Schools always
will want the best possible learning outcomes; thus, that will remain a

64.

Note, supra note 20, at 951 (citing Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher

Education: The Diversity Rationale and the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 381, 435 (1998)); Janet W. Schofield, Promoting Positive Peer Relations in
Desegregated Schools, in BEYOND DESEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF QUALITY IN AFRICAN
AMERICAN SCHOOLING 93 (Mwalimu J. Shujaa ed., 1996); see also CHRISTOPHER EDLEY,
JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE, AND AMERICAN VALUES 126

(1996).

65.
Sheryll D. Cashin, Drifting Apart: How Wealth and Race Segregation are
Reshaping the American Dream, 47 VILL. L. REV. 595, 596-98 (2002); see also Bollinger,

supra note
66.
93).
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

6, at 1590.
See generally Note, supra note 20, at 950 (citing Schofield, supra note 64, at
Note, supra note 20, at 950.
Cashin, supra note 65, at 595.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
Bollinger, supra note 6, at 1590.
Id.
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continual, non-time sensitive interest. Next, we must remember that
sometime after 2050, no one racial group will constitute a majority in the
United States. 72 The more highly educated the growing minority
population is in the United States, the more competitive the United States'
economy will be, and the more cohesive society will be.73 Some employers
believe diversity is critical to success and competitiveness and thus, they
expect higher education to prepare students for the work environment.74
Therefore, preparing students for an increasingly diverse work force and
society is similarly non-time sensitive and will become even more of a
compelling interest as time goes on since American society is becoming
more racially diverse.
Finally, the Court found that universities, particularly law schools, are
the training grounds for many of the United States' federal and state
political leaders; thus, these institutions must be open to all people in a
heterogeneous society.75 The Court concluded that to cultivate a set of
leaders with legitimacy in the citizenry it is necessary that the path to
leadership positions be open to individuals of every race.76 Obviously, the
legitimacy of American leaders is a continual, non-time sensitive interestvirtually no one would advance an argument for illegitimate leaders. The
legitimacy of governmental leadership in the people they serve is a
cornerstone of any democratic republic; thus, it is as compelling an interest
as possible. Consequently, ensuring the training ground for future leaders
reflects the heterogeneous, racially diverse nature of society, thereby
ensuring legitimacy in future leaders will always be a compelling interest.
B.

RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS WILL REMAIN NARROWLY TAILORED

The Court's assertion that race-conscious admissions programs must
end does not match the second prong of strict scrutiny review-will
evaluating race in admissions programs be narrowly tailored to meet the
compelling interest of diversity? The Court's conclusion that racial
classifications may be employed no more broadly then their interest

72.

Cashin, supra note 65, at 595.

73.
John Friedl, Making a Compelling Casefor Diversity in College Admissions, 61
U. PiTT. L. REV. 1, 14 (1999) (citing Hugh B. Price, Fortifying the Casefor Diversity and
Affirmative Action, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., May 22, 1999, at B4, B5).

74.
Friedl, supra note 73, at 27 (citing American Council on Education, Board of
Directors Statement on Affirmative Action and Diversity 87 (1995)).
75.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003).
76.
Id.
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commands 77 contradicts its other conclusion that there is "no reason to
exempt race-conscious admissions programs from the requirement that all
governmental use of race must have a logical end point., 78 Remember, the
Court's reasoning establishes that race-conscious admissions programs
should be limited in time if such limitations correspond to the interest the
The compelling interest for the race-conscious
program serves. 79
admissions program in Grutteris diversity. 80 To examine if a time limit for
race-conscious admissions programs is appropriate or not, therefore, we
must determine if race-conscious admissions programs can be narrowly
tailored in the future to meet the compelling interest of diversity. If they
cannot be, then race-conscious admissions programs could be required to
terminate. On the other hand, if race-conscious admissions programs can
remain narrowly tailored, then they can exist in the future, thereby
preventing setting an end point for race-conscious admissions programs.
Since diversity is a non-time sensitive interest and race-conscious
admissions programs can be narrowly tailored to meet that goal, then future
race-conscious admissions will also be narrowly tailored and non-time
sensitive. Remember, the Court stated: "[R]acial classifications, however
compelling their goals, are potentially so dangerous that they may be
employed no more broadly than the interest demands. 81 As stated above,
the Court's reasoning establishes that race-conscious admissions programs
should be limited in time if such limitations correspond to the interest the
program serves. 82 We now know that the interest race-conscious
admissions serve, diversity, which the Grutter majority concluded was a
As such, an
compelling interest, is a non-time sensitive interest.
admissions program can continually refer to the race of applicants because
placing a time limitation on referring to an applicant's race does not
correspond with diversity's non-time sensitive nature.
The Court, therefore, contradicts itself in what is just one example of
its paradoxical reasoning in Grutter. If diversity constitutes a non-time
sensitive compelling interest, then narrowly tailored racial classifications
can be implemented to meet that compelling interest without violating the
Equal Protection Clause, regardless of when they are implemented.83 The

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.
77.
Id.
78.
Post, supra note 6, at 67 n.306.
79.
80.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
81.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.
Post, supra note 6, at 67 n.306.
82.
One commentator concludes Grutter's expectation that race will not be needed
83.
to achieve diversity is a push to get educational leaders to assume responsibility for
creatively fashioning admissions that will fit society's changing reality. Guinier, supra note
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Court, therefore, includes two mutually exclusive concepts in its
rationale--diversity is a compelling interest, but consideration of race must
eventually conclude. Ensuring diversity exists necessarily includes, not
excludes, evaluating race. To ensure all the benefits of racial diversity
persist, law schools can focus on race to the extent necessary to achieve
these goals. 84 Since Grutter points to the particular and unique values of
racial diversity 85, which are not time-sensitive, evaluation of race cannot
have a termination point since diversity is an accepted, continual
compelling interest.
Specifically, the benefits of diversity the Court found are directly
related to racial diversity; thus, evaluating race would naturally be an
appropriate means to reach the end of achieving diversity. The Court found
that a diverse student body promotes cross-racial understanding, helps to
break down stereotypes and enables students to better understand persons
of different races. 86 The Court emphasized that diverse universities
promote better learning outcomes and prepare students for an increasingly
diverse work force and society.87 Finally, the Court found that universities,
particularly law schools, are the training grounds for many of the United
States' federal and state political leaders, thus, these institutions must be
open to all people in a heterogeneous society.88 The Court concluded that
to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the citizenry it is necessary89
that the path to leadership positions be open to individuals of every race.
These benefits of diversity are specifically related to racial diversity.
Cross-racial understanding and breaking down stereotypes is inextricably
linked with the presence of different races, therefore, an admissions
program can evaluate the race of applicants to ensure a racially diverse
student body exists to attain these race-based benefits. Next, if racial
diversity creates better learning outcomes for all, then how could looking at
the very characteristic that creates better learning outcomes, race, not be
evaluated? Finally, if the training ground for leadership positions must be
open for all, then the characteristic that has denied an opening for many,
race, can be evaluated to ensure persons of that race are included. How
then can an admissions program not evaluate the race of applicants to attain
these benefits? It would be like stating that having competitive athletes at
universities is a compelling interest, but evaluating whether or not an
6, at 181.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Post, supra note 6, at 69-70.
Id. at 70.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330.
Id. at 330.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332-33.
Id.
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applicant was a high school athlete is not a narrowly tailored method of
achieving that compelling interest.
C.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT'S PURPOSE

1.

Grutter's Faulty Reasoning

The Court incorrectly stated the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose.
Thus, it provides weak authority for its conclusion that race-conscious
admissions programs must eventually terminate. The Court abruptly
announced that: "race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in
time." 90 The Court does not cite any authority for this grandiose legal
pronouncement. The curious reader has to infer that the Court based this
definitive pronouncement on one quotation above it in the opinion that
stated: "We are mindful, however, that '[a] core purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed
discrimination based on race."' 9 1
Before discussing whether or not that conclusion is accurate, we must
understand what it means in relation to the constitutionality of raceIf all government discrimination,
conscious admissions programs.
distinction or classification based upon race must be limited in time and
thus conclude, then colorblindness must eventually exist under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Colorblindness commands that the government be
colorblind in its treatment of persons, that it accord benefits and burdens to
all races according to the same criteria.92 A colorblind admissions process
means any and all considerations of race, invidious or benign, are
outlawed. 93 Race-conscious admissions programs, therefore, would be
unconstitutional because they consider the race of applicants.
Little, if any, authority supports the Court's sweeping declaration that
race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. The Court's

90.
91.

Id. at 342.
Id. (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)).

92.
Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative
Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1334 (1986).
93.
John Cocchi Day, Retelling the Story of Affirmative Action: Reflections on a
Decade of Federal Jurisprudence in the Public Workplace, 89 CAL. L. REV. 59, 62 n.6

(2001). Stated another way, color-blindness is a legal theory requiring that the government
should never take race into account, regardless of the context in which race is used. Tanya

Kateri Hernandez, "Multiracial"Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of Color-Blind
Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REV. 97, 139 (citing T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for RaceConsciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1063 (1991)).
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reliance on one quote from one case to determine a core component of the
Fourteenth Amendment's purpose and its extrapolation from that that raceconscious admissions must be limited in time is using a scintilla of support
for two mountainous legal determinations. Furthermore, a review of the
case the Court cited, Palmore v. Sidoti,94 further weakens the
pronouncement's value. If you are scratching your head trying to think
what race-conscious admissions case Palmore is, stop scratching; it is not a
race-conscious admissions case. It is a case where a fit, white mother was
deprived of custody of her white child partially because she was involved
in an interracial relationship. 95 As part of the rationale for overturning the
custody determination, the Court made the statement the Grutter court
quoted. 96 Grutter's reliance on a twenty-year-old custody case to
determine a core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment and its use of that
to develop a time limit for race-conscious admissions programs is loose
authority and reasoning at best. The Court essentially left us with a 1984
family law case providing the foundation for establishing the termination
requirement of race-conscious admissions programs.
Ironically, Grutter also fails to indicate that Palmore was not the
originator of the quote in question. Palmore quoted Strauder v. West
Virginia97 , a case that invalidated a West Virginia statute preventing
African-Americans from serving on juries.98 While Strauder did not deal
with a race-conscious admissions program, it did provide a discussion of
the Fourteenth Amendment's purpose, which Grutterfails to reference, but
I include below.
2.

The Actual Purpose of the FourteenthAmendment

a.

The Fourteenth Amendment's Text Does Not Require Colorblindness

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states:
"No State shall ... deprive any person ... within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." 99 There is nothing in the clause's text requiring
complete colorblindness. 00 The Court has "found" the principle of

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

466 U.S. 429 (1984).
Id. at 431-32.
Id. at 432.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08, 310 (1880).
Id. at 304-05.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

100.
Vikram David Amar, The 2002-03 Supreme Court Term in Review: Landmark
Cases Stress the Theme Of Equality, at http://writ.news.findlaw.conmamar/2003071 l.html
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colorblindness in the Equal Protection Clause, °' but has not read it from
the clause's text because the words "colorblind" or "colorblindness" are not
found in the Constitution. 0 2 Since the Fourteenth Amendment's text does
not require colorblindness, a colorblind equal protection jurisprudence
should not appeal to originalists and textualists, 10 3 such as Justices Scalia
and Thomas. Justices Scalia and Thomas, however, advocate a colorblind
jurisprudence even though they generally do not cite the Fourteenth
Amendment's text to defend their view that racial classifications are per se
illegal.'04 Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Supreme Court's decisions
and contemporary history's lessons lead him to conclude discrimination on
the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional and destructive of a
democratic society.10 5 Justice Thomas concluded that governmental use of
race for benefits and burdens demeans every person.'0 6 It is clear,
therefore, that Justices Scalia and Thomas's colorblind jurisprudence is
nothing more than a value judgment derived from constitutional culture,
not constitutional text.'0 7
One commentator who argues that the Equal Protection Clause
requires colorblindness incorrectly cites and interprets the Fourteenth
Amendment's text. Scott Olson stated: "The Fourteenth Amendment states
that all people should be treated equally."'1 8 The Fourteenth Amendment
does not state that. As indicated above, it states: "No State shall ... deny
to any person ...the equal protection of the laws."' 0 9 Therefore, all people
do not necessarily have to be treated equally. Instead, no state can deny any
person the equal protection of the laws. Olson's inaccuracy continues
when he defines "equality," not "equal" or even "equally" as he previously
mentioned. Olson defined equality as "under the same conditions and

(last visited May 13, 2004).
101.

Michael C. Dorf, Could Justice Scalia's Affirmative Action Dissent Become a

102.

JAMIN B. RASKIN, OVERRULING DEMOCRACY: THE

103.
104.

Id.
Post, supra note 6, at 65 n.294 (citing Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and

Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20031126.html (last visited
May 13, 2004).
AMERICAN PEOPLE 86 (2003).

SUPREME COURT VS. THE

the Legislative History of the FourteenthAmendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985)).

105.
Post, supra note 6, at 65 n.294. (citing J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521
concurring)).
(1989) (Scalia, J.,
Post, supra note 6, at 65 n.294. (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 353 (Thomas, J.,
106.
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
Post, supra note 6, at 65 n.294.
107.
Scott L. Olson, The Case Against Affirmative Action in the Admissions Process,
108.
58 U. PnT. L. REV. 991, 1013 (1997).
109.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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among persons similarly situated."' 0 Olson, however, relied on Black's
Law Dictionary for that definition, not an ordinary, English dictionary.
This creates text-based interpretive problems. There are generally two
types of textual analysis. 1 ' Plain meaning textualists look to current
ordinary dictionaries to determine what a term means, while original intent
textualists look to ordinary dictionaries available at the time a term was
adopted. I I2
Since Olson bases his textual analysis on what the
amendment's drafters intended, 1 3 he would have to rely on an ordinary
dictionary from 1868 or before to correctly state what the Equal Protection
Clause's drafters intended at that time, not Black's Law Dictionary.
b.
The Original Intent of the Fourteenth Amendment Does Not Require
Colorblindness
Furthermore, an original intent theory does not support the notion that
the Amendment requires colorblindness. For example, the end to de jure
segregation in Brown v. Board of Education114 was properly decided under
what the Equal Protection Clause says, even though leading conservative
commentator, Robert H. Bork, and leading liberal commentator, Laurence
H. Tribe, each concluded that the Clause's drafters probably did not intend
it to end segregation." 15 In other words, the Equal Protection Clause's text
provided a basis for ending segregation even though various supporters of
6
the Fourteenth Amendment stated that it would not end segregation.'
That conclusion is affirmed by Congress's continuation of segregation in

110.
Olson, supra note 108, at 1013 (quoting
ed. 1990)).
Ill.

112.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

536 (6th

Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 788 (1999).

Id. at 788-89.

113.
Olson, supra note 108, at 1013. For the record, I do not believe that drafters'
intention is a correct interpretive theory. See Christopher J. Schmidt, Revitalizing the Quiet
Ninth Amendment: Determining Unenumerated Rights and Eliminating Substantive Due
Process, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 169, 199-206 (2003); Christopher J. Schmidt, Analyzing the
Text of the Equal Protection Clause: Why the Definition of "Equal" Requires a
Disproportionate Impact Analysis When Laws Unequally Affect Racial Minorities, 12
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 85, 105-08 (2002).

114.
115.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Laurence H. Tribe, in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:

FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 68 (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 75-

76, 82 (1990)).
116.
See Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 26, 64 (2000).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24

the District of Columbia's schools after the Fourteenth Amendment's
ratification.' 17
the Fourteenth
around
enacted
legislation
Congressional
Amendment's adoption verifies that the Amendment provides
colorblindness to protect racial minorities from discrimination against
them, while also allowing race-conscious measures to remedy the affects of
past discrimination implemented against them. When Congress adopted
the Amendment in 1866 (before its ratification in 1868), it passed a statute
giving '"citizens, of every race and color ...

the same right in every State

and Territory. .. to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal
property

. . .

as is enjoyed by white citizens ....

8 The statute's key

language is as is enjoyed by white citizens. A true colorblind statute would
not include that language-it would include colorblind language like: "as is
enjoyed by white all citizens." In the actual statute, remedying past
discrimination and striving for equality was addressed by ensuring racial
minorities would have the same contract and property rights as whites.
Contract and property rights had to be colorblind as of the statute's effect in
order to remedy past discrimination and allow racial minorities to enjoy the
same rights white citizens enjoy. Therefore, remedying past discrimination
against racial minorities utilized colorblindness as a mechanism in contract
and property rights to ensure discrimination against racial minorities would
cease, but the statute's text was not truly colorblind and its purpose was not
either.
The statute is an example of what I call "race-consciousness
At first glance that term might seem paradoxical.
colorblindness."
It simply means that race-consciousness can exist
it
is
not.
However,
through colorblind policies. In other words, the statute above calls for
colorblind treatment under the law. It does so, however, by recognizing the
previous unequal racial treatment in favor of whites. To ensure fair
treatment for all races in contract and property rights, the statute was
conscious that minorities did not previously have the same rights as whites,
and to achieve equality, these minorities need the level of rights whites
enjoyed. Therefore, the statute took race, racial privilege and racial
discrimination into account, thus, it was "race-conscious" when it provided
for "colorblindness."

117.
118.

67, at 119.
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, quoted in Louis H. Pollak, Racial
DWORKIN, supra note

Discriminationand JudicialIntegrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1,

10(1959).
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The most poignant evidence that the Equal Protection Clause does not
require colorblindness is found in race-conscious federal legislation passed
around the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification. The Congress that
promulgated the Fourteenth Amendment enacted a number of raceconscious legislative measures. 1 9 One federal statute provided money for
"destitute colored women and children."' 120 A welfare statute gave money
to "colored" people in the District of Columbia.12 1 Congress also made
special appropriations and adopted special procedures for granting bounty
22
and prize money to the Union army's "colored" soldiers and sailors.
Under the Freedman's Bureau, Congress also distributed free food, clothing
and other supplies to African-Americans. 123 The Freedman's Bureau also
authorized the government to take abandoned and confiscated land and
divide it into forty acre lots for rent and eventual sale to AfricanAmericans. 124
Not only was all this legislation race-conscious, it specifically
provided racial preferences for minorities. Congress, therefore, practiced
race-conscious affirmative action on a number of occasions during the
Reconstruction Era. 125 The Congress that made the Equal Protection
Clause gave itself the power to create race-conscious legislation, thus, race126
consciousness meets the text and spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Therefore, Congress's race-conscious actions in the 1860s prove that a true
believer in the text or original meaning of the Constitution would be
obliged to conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause allows race-conscious programs and preferences.' 27 Consequently,
the Equal Protection Clause does not require colorblindness.
The requirement that all governmental use of race cease and
colorblindness exist is, in fact, not a requirement, but a theory.
Colorblindness is just one of any number of theories seeking to interpret
the Equal Protection Clause. 128 Nothing in the Constitution's text requires

119.
See generally Jed Rubenfeld, The Moment and the Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1085, 1106-07 (1998) (citing Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427,

430-32 (1997)).
120.
121.

Id. at 430 (citing Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 296, 14 Stat. 310, at 317).
Id. at 430-31 (citing Resolution of Mar. 16, 1867, No. 4, 15 Stat. 20).

122.
Id. at 431 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 227, 17 Stat. 510, 528; Act of Mar. 3,
1869, ch. 122, 15 Stat. 301, 302); Resolution of June 15, 1866, No. 46, 14 Stat. 357, 358-59.
123.
RASKIN, supra note 102, at 87 (citing ERIC FONER, AMERICA'S UNFINISHED

REVOLUTION 1863-1877 69 (1988)).
124.
Id.
125.
Rubenfeld, supra note 119, at 1106-07.
126.
RASKIN, supra note 102, at 87.
127.
Rubenfeld, supra note 119, at 1107.

128.

Kennedy, supra note 92, at 1335.
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129
colorblindness, nor does an original intent theory support colorblindness.
Concluding that ensuring equal protection requires colorblindness puts
theory before text. Colorblindness may or may not, depending on many
circumstances, provide equal protection. Similarly, race-consciousness
may or may not, depending on many circumstances, provide equal
protection.
Consequently, the theory of colorblindness cannot be
transformed and placed into the text of the Equal Protection Clause. If a
racial classification contains a compelling interest, such as diversity, and it
is narrowly tailored to meet that goal, time cannot rule that classification
unconstitutional. Therefore, it is clear the Court must assert colorblindness.
This is eventually required under the Fourteenth Amendment in order to
establish authority to eliminate any race-conscious admissions program
from being considered narrowly tailored and, thus, constitutional.
A review of many court decisions and commentators' works shows
the Fourteenth Amendment, in fact, actually contained at least two original
purposes: achieving colorblindness and providing equal opportunities for
freed African-Americans.1 30 Stated differently, the dual themes of the
Fourteenth Amendment included providing anti-discrimination through the
principle of colorblindness and remedying past discrimination against
racial minorities.131 When these goals conflict, many commentators believe
remedial purpose should control. 32
But instead of conflicting,
colorblindness and 'race-consciousness are complimentary constitutional
concepts because the Amendment originally was prompted
by an overall
133
concern with the status of African-Americans.
Justice Ginsburg
described this ideal:

[T]he Constitution is both color blind and color conscious.
To avoid conflict with the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause, a
classification that denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes
a burden must not be based on race. In that sense, the

129.
130.
131.

Id.
Ely, supra note 8, at 143.
Id. at 143 n.70.

132.
Id. (citing Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 107, 147 (1976); Sedler, Racial Preference, Reality and the Constitution: Bakke v.

Regents of the University of California, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329, 365 (1977); Ball,
Judicial Protectionfor Powerless Minorities, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1059, 1072-73 (1974); John
Hart Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse Discrimination,41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 729-33
(1974); Hastie, Affirmative Action in Vindicating Civil Rights, 1975 U. ILL. L. REV. 502,
506).
133.
Donald E. Lively & Stephen Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurisprudence of
Denialand Evasion, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1307, 1319 (1991).
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Constitution is color blind. But the Constitution is color
conscious to prevent discrimination being perpetuated and
to undo the effects of past discrimination. 134
The conclusion that the Constitution is both colorblind and raceconscious fulfills the amendment's original primary importance of
protecting African-Americans. 35 Specifically, the amendment's original
purpose included granting African-Americans all the civil rights that whites
enjoy. 136 Since the amendment was originally designed to protect AfricanAmericans, no discrimination was to be made againstthem because of their
race. 137 In other words, the amendment provides African-Americans with
the right to be exempt from unfriendly legislation against them that would
make them a subject race.1 38 Equal protection, thus, prohibits reinforcing
the subordinate position of a historically disadvantaged group, such as
African-Americans. 139
This interpretation squares with the historical context of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Thirteenth Amendment eliminated slavery' 44°
and the Fifteenth Amendment guaranteed all races the right to vote.'
Consequently, to comply with the prevention of racial discrimination those
amendments provide, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 42Protection
Clause was originally concerned with providing racial equality. 1
Grutter ignores the fact that racial discrimination was originally
defined as the prohibition or exclusion of African-Americans and other
disadvantaged groups from access to normal or equal participation in
society. 143 The Court now incorrectly defines racial discrimination to mean
any racial distinction.' 44 The Amendment's equal protection requirement
prevents discrimination upon racial minorities, which necessarily includes
and encompasses colorblind law that could prevent discrimination against
racial minorities. The Amendment, does not, however, prevent using a

134.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 at 302 (2003) (quoting United States v.
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966)).
135.
Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 266, 291 (1978)).
136.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880).
137.
Id. at 307.
138.
Id. at 308.
139.
Fiss, supra note 132, at 157.
140.
141.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.

142.
Lively & Plass, supra note 133, at 1310.
143.
Ron Walters, Affirmative Action and the Politics of Concept Appropriation, 38
How. L.J. 587, 600 (1995).
144.
Id.
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racial minorities' race as a positive classification. In fact, that type of use
fulfills the Amendment's remedial and protective purpose, which, over
time, also fulfills the Amendment's colorblind purpose because it moves
society closer to potentially gaining equality. Thus, an anti-discrimination
45
principle, such as colorblindness, is just one aspect of equal protection.
D.

COLORBLINDNESS IS NOT THE LEGAL NORM

The Court's argument for a time limit for race-conscious admissions
programs took another curious turn when it again made statements that
actually support the continual constitutionality of race-conscious
admissions programs as long as inequality exists. The Court supports its
time limitation pronouncement by stating: "The requirement that all raceconscious admissions programs have a termination point 'assures all
citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all racial and
ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the
goal of equality itself."",146 The norm in the United States is not colorblind, non-preferential racial treatment.
An egalitarian tradition of
disfavoring racial discrimination exists only through lip service supplied in
official documents. 147 In reality, a quite different and malevolent tradition
of official and unofficial racial discrimination against minorities 148 existed
from slavery to Jim Crow to the civil rights battles of the 1960s.
1.

A History of Racial Discrimination

Discrimination against racial minorities in the Americas commenced
well before the United States became a sovereign nation. In the early
1600s, African-Americans were forced to the United States in chains in
order to be sold into slavery. 149 Slaves were deprived of all legal rights and
thrust into bondage for forced labor. 150 The Declaration of Independence in

145.
Ely, supra note 8, at 143.
146.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (quoting J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 510).
147.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 61 (1980). The Constitution, for
example, is held as a pillar of equality, but it contained clauses protecting and recognizing
the institution of slavery without ever mentioning the word "slavery." Toni Morrison, Book
Review: Think About Race and Races: Reflections and Responses, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1653,
1653 (2001) (citing DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 46-48 (4th ed.

2000)).

148.
149.
150.

Morrison, supra note 147.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 387-88.
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1776, which asserted the American colonies' independence from British
rule, implicitly protected slavery.15' The Constitution codified slavery into
law in its 1789 ratification. Specifically, it treated a slave as being threefifths of a person when apportioning representatives and taxes among the
states,152 ensured migrating or importing slaves into the country would be
legal until at least 1808,153 and required that a slave who escaped to another
state must be returned on the claim of their master. 54 Southern states
protected slavery through Slave Codes, which primarily protected a slave
owner's property interest in a slave. 55 African-Americans gained
156
emancipation from slavery at the end of the Civil War in the mid-1860s.
The Union won the Civil War and three constitutional amendments were
ratified, including the Fourteenth, which were aimed at reconstructing the
nation. The Thirteenth Amendment ended slavery,157 the Fourteenth
prevented states from denying equal protection, due process, and 59privileges
and immunities, 58 and the Fifteenth guaranteed the right to vote. 1
Unfortunately, despite legislative efforts discussed above, AfricanAmericans remained at a legal inferiority to whites for a century after the
Civil War. 60 The Court curtailed many of the substantive protections
contained in the Civil War Amendments.' 6 1 The Court invalidated sections
of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 that criminalized denying equal access to
62
inns, public conveyances, theatres and other places of public amusement.1
Then the Court upheld racially segregated passenger 63accommodations on
railroads in the infamous Plessy v. Fergusondecision. 1
After Plessy, many states expanded segregation laws, or Jim Crow
laws, with damning results. 164 Racial segregation extended to residential
65
areas, parks, hospitals, theatres, waiting rooms and bathrooms.
Segregation also extended geographically since northern, as well as
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152.
153.
154.

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
v. Reese,
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 388.
Id. at 389 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2).
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9).
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2).
Bakke, 438 U.S. 266.
Id. at 390.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 390 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 391 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall 36, 70 (1873); United States
92 U.S. 214 (1876); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876)).
Id. (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).
Id. at 392 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
Id. at 393.
Id.
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southern states implemented Jim Crow. 166 In fact, the federal government
practiced widespread segregation as separate desks, bathrooms, and
cafeteria tables were established according to race. 67
Segregation
extended to the military where African-Americans, for the most part, were
confined to separate units during both World War I and World War II168
President Truman ordered an end to military segregation in 1948,169 and
segregation in secondary, undergraduate and graduate education came to an
end after a series of court decisions in the mid-20th Century. 70
2.

HistoricalUnderstandingof Mid-2Oth Century ColorblindLaws

The long history of racial discrimination against African-Americans
led to utilizing colorblind law to eradicate such discrimination. In the
1940s through the 1960s, against the backdrop of laws excluding AfricanAmericans from opportunities whites had, it appeared colorblind law could
end that racial subjugation. 7 History shows, however, that colorblind
72
legislation was used as a proxy in order to eradicate racial subjugation.
For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ensured that all citizens would
have similar and fair access to employment, public accommodations,
education and public facilities. 73 Colorblindness, in that context, targeted
the procedures that overtly excluded African-Americans based on their
race, 174 thus, colorblindness in this context was once again race-conscious
as it was implemented to address racial discrimination.
Advocates of colorblindness, such as the Grutter majority's raceconscious admissions programs termination requirement, eschew the
historical context of colorblind law. 175 Since racial equality is not static, it
gathers meaning as historical conditions change. 176
Insisting that

166.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 394.
167.
Id.
168.
Id. at 266.
169.
Id.
170.
Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Morgan v. Virginia,
328 U.S. 373 (1946); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma St.
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)).
171.
Kennedy, supra note 92, at 1335.
172.
Id.
173.
Note, The Relationship Between Equality and Access in Law School
Admissions, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1452 (2000) (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964)).
174.
Kennedy, supra note 92, at 1335.
175.
Id.
176.
Id. at n.32.
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colorblindness must apply in all circumstances, no matter how it affects
African-Americans, ignores that the Equal Protection Clause was originally
designed to protect African-Americans. 77 Therefore, when the historical
contexts of equal protection law---colorblindness and remedying past
discrimination against African-Americans--are synthesized, it is clear that
78
the Constitution prohibits any arrangements imposing racial subjugation.
Grutter admits that "[c]ontext matters when reviewing race-based
governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause."' 179 The Court,
therefore, provides yet another paradox. If the context of race-based
government action matters, then the Equal Protection Clause cannot require
a termination for race-conscious admissions programs. That termination
requirement, expected in twenty-five years, would eliminate reviewing the
context of a race-conscious program since regardless of its context it would
be outlawed.
Obviously, the end of legal segregation did not immediately eradicate
the centuries-long record of racial discrimination. Factual segregation did
not immediately end, nor did African-Americans move from a position of
legal inferiority to one of equality. 80
The legacy of slavery and
segregation could not be easily eliminated.' S ' Therefore, the historical
condition of racial inequality persisted in a new context, which necessarily
means new measures were needed to address racial inequality as colorblind
laws ending de jure segregation and the denial of fundamental rights did
not eliminate racial discrimination and create equality. For example, a
historically recent race-conscious legislative measure, the Voting Rights
Act, requires that states afford 82minorities an equal opportunity to
participate in the electoral process.
Race-conscious admissions programs did not always exist, however.
This prior non-existence was because those disfavoring racial
discrimination against minorities "had their hands full attempting, generally
unsuccessfully, to combat widespread official discrimination against
minorities."'' 83
When the historical condition switched after the
implementation of colorblind laws ending de jure segregation and the

177.
Id. at 1335-36 (citing Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrines, 62 MINN. L. REV.

1049, 1066 (1978)).
178.
Kennedy, supra note 92, at 1336.
179.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 343-44
(1960).
180.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 394 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
181. Id.
182.
Feldman, supra note 20, at 161 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973aa-6 (1988)).
183.
ELY, supra note 147, at 61.
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denial of fundamental rights, the means needed to achieve racial equality
changed along with the historical condition. Currently, a belief in
colorblindness makes no sense in a society in which identifiable groups
have been treated differently historically and in which the effects of that
treatment exist today.' 84
Therefore, race-conscious, result-oriented
remedies should be favored over colorblind, process-oriented remedies
under the current historical condition. 85 Race-consciousness, either for or
against racial minorities, has continually existed throughout the United
States' history and does not deviate from the equal protection norm.
Instead, providing a mandatory termination of it does.
E.

RETURNING TO REMEDY?

1.

Is Remedy Now Relevant?

The Court's paradoxical reasoning again takes form when it invokes
the remedial concept behind race-conscious admissions programs-a
concept it did not cite as a justification for the race-conscious admissions
program it upheld. 86 The Court did not state a race-conscious admissions
program could or could not satisfy constitutional muster if it was justified
by remedying past discrimination against racial minorities.187 The Court
only concluded remedying past discrimination is not
the only possible
88
justification for race-conscious admissions programs.
In its discussion of the necessity of time limitations, 89 the Court relies
on a 1977 article for the proposition that the acid test for the justification of
race-conscious admissions will be their efficacy in eliminating the need for
any racial preferences at all. 90 The Court's reference to the hypothesis that

184.
Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformationand Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1345
(1988).
185.
Id. at 1346.
186.
Although diversity was the compelling interest in Grutter, some commentators
believe "diversity" serves as a cover for universities' true desire of allowing a fair
representation of mistreated minority groups in their student bodies. Post, supra note 6, at
64 (citing Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 601 (2000)). See also
Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (concluding universities will continue to
maintain minority enrollment even if they have to do so by camouflaging their true desires
under different programs).
187.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 345-46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
188.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 326.
189.
Post, supra note 6, at n.306.
190.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 342-43 (citing Nathanson & Bartnik, The Constitutionality
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racial preferences will be justified on their effectiveness in eliminating the
need for them shows that as long as equality is not achieved in academic
settings, their use can continue. In other words, the Court's determination
as to whether or not race-conscious admissions programs are necessary
depends upon if they have remedied past discrimination against minorities.
The Court's remedial-oriented "acid test" point is irrelevant to its
diversity reasoning that the "acid test" for the law school's race-conscious
admissions program should be the creation of competent professionals,
informed and participatory citizens, and legitimate national leaders.' 9' The
requirement that race-conscious admissions programs be limited in time
originated in programs that sought to serve remedial interests. 92 As Justice
Blackmun stated: .'[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take
account of race. There is no other way." ' 193 The nature of a remedial
program, which is to get beyond racism, establishes a time limit for its
justification. 94 Once racism or racial discrimination is remedied, then
race-conscious programs would end. In fact, time limitations were
established to ensure race-conscious programs were truly remedial. 95 On
the other hand, as stated above, the justification for diversity, which
Grutter found to be a compelling interest, does not have a built-in time
limitation. 96 Therefore, for the time-limitation to be accurate, Grutter's
diversity rationale must be quasi-remedial. 9 7 Since Grutter did not use
remedying past discrimination as a justification for the Law School policy,
its reasoning using remedying past discrimination as a basis to set a time
limit on race-conscious admissions programs is paradoxical.
These
contradictory impulses of accepting diversity, not the remedial nature of a
program, to justify it and then using a program's remedial nature to
evaluate its affect creates the Court's uncertain and inaccurate conclusion
that it expects race-conscious
admissions programs to be unnecessary in
98
twenty-five years.
If remedying past discrimination is not a compelling interest to justify
race-conscious admissions programs, then how and why are its remedial

of Preferential Treatmentfor Minority Applicants to Professional Schools, 58 Chicago Bar

Rec. 282, 293 (May-June 1977)).
191.
Post, supra note 6, at 68 n.306.
192.
Id.at 67 n.306.
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Bakke, 438 U.S. at 407 (Blackmun, J.,
opinion) quoted in Post, supra note 6, at
68 n.306.
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197.
Id.
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affects the determination of whether or not it should continue? The
paradox does not end there. If the effectiveness of race-conscious
admissions programs is the controlling standard as to their ability to exist,
then the state of racial equality, not an arbitrary time limitation on using
race-consciousness controls the constitutionality of race-conscious
admissions programs. Put another way, the Court concludes it will look to
whether racial equality exists to determine when race-conscious admissions
programs should cease. This contradicts its required termination of race99
conscious admissions programs because we do not know when, if ever,'
racial equality will exist. If, as the Court concedes, racial preferences are
to serve the goal of equality, then they remain constitutional as long as they
remedy past discrimination, protect minorities and strive towards achieving
equality. If equality between the races does not exist, then racial
preferences can continue in order to reach for equality.
2.

Will Equality Exist in Twenty-Five Years?

Finally, the Court appears to set a specific time limit on the
constitutionality of race-conscious admissions programs. The Court cites
the Law School's statements that it would like to find a race-neutral
formula and terminate its race-conscious program as soon as possible to
validate its conclusion that race-conscious programs must eventually
terminate.
It goes on to conclude twenty-five years passed since it
eliminated set-asides in admissions programs,2 ° 1 with the number of
minority applicants with high grades and test scores increasing since that
time period.20 2 Then the Court concludes: "[w]e expect that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the
interest approved today. 20 3
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Thomas partially caught this error.
Ginsburg, joined by Breyer, concluded that: "one may hope, but not firmly
forecast, that over the next generation's span, progress toward
nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe to

199.
Some commentators go as far as to say that law relating to inequality is unlikely
to provide the means of achieving racial equality in our society. See Derrick Bell, Racial
Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudenceof
Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741 (1994), cited in Kathryn Abrams, Book Review: Race
and Races: Constructing a New Legal Actor, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1589, 1591 n.7 (2001).
200.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 343.
201.
Id. (referring to Bakke, 438 U.S. at 3 17-18 (Powell, J., opinion)).
Id.
202.
203.
Id. at 343.
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sunset affirmative action. 2 °" Thomas, while opposing the use of raceconscious admissions programs, stated: "[n]o one can seriously contend...
that the racial gap in academic credentials will disappear in 25 years. 20 5
Unfortunately, history and data suggest that the racial gap will not close in
twenty-five years. It has only been fifty years since the Court declared
public school segregation unconstitutional. 20 6 That declaration, after
prolonged resistance, yielded an end to a law-enforced racial caste system
that was a legacy of centuries of slavery.20 7 Thus, we are not distantly
removed from an overtly discriminatory past, and the effects of centuries of
law-sanctioned inequality remain painfully evident in our communities and
schools.2 °8 Justice Ginsburg summarized current racial disparities as
follows:
Unemployment, poverty, and access to health care vary
disproportionately by race. Neighborhoods and schools
remain racially divided. African-American and Hispanic
children are all too often educated in poverty-stricken and
underperforming institutions. Adult African-Americans
and Hispanics generally earn less than whites with
equivalent levels of education. Equally credentialed job
applicants receive different receptions depending on their
race. Irrational prejudice is still encountered in real estate
markets and consumer transactions. 2°
Therefore, the claim that the law must be colorblind is an aspiration
rather than a description of reality. 210 The arbitrary twenty-five-year time
limit, seemingly only based upon duplicating the time period from the
Bakke decision to the Grutter decision, ignores that terminating such raceconscious admissions programs should conclude as soon as possible under
a remedial theory. An arbitrary line in the sand cannot set that time.
Justice Thomas admits that ruling race-conscious admissions programs

204.
Id. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
205.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 376 (Thomas, J.,
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206.
Id. at 343.
207.
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209.
Id. at 299 (citations omitted). For a full list of the data supporting Justice
Ginsburg's statement, see Id. at 299-300 n.l-9.
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L. REV. 493, 502-04 (1996).
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unconstitutional in twenty-five years will not be contingent upon the racial
gap closing in that time. 2 1 The "as soon as possible" ideal, however, is
based upon the Court's prior pronouncement that race-consciousness exists
to gain equality and its elimination is based upon its effectiveness in
eliminating its own need. 2 Since racial discrimination in social life exists,
and presumably will exist in twenty-five years, the abolition of raceconscious admissions programs before that would reestablish government
acquiescence to social inequality under a remedial theory. 213 Therefore,
under a remedial theory, only when equality is gained should race24
conscious programs be terminated in order to provide racial neutrality. '
Or should they be terminated at all?
3.

Will ColorblindnessPreserve Equality?

If race-consciousness ultimately creates equality, and its subsequent
elimination means society falls back to inequality, then race-consciousness
should not be eliminated. We must recognize that universities must take a
long view approach to race-conscious admissions.2 5 Admissions programs
may not be immediately effective and goals may not be achieved.2 16
Impatient universities may substitute short-term results for principled
outcomes. 217 This may present the appearance of equality, while the actual
"disparities in opportunity and attainment are the rule rather than the
exception.,, 21 8 Eliminating race-conscious admissions programs means a
colorblind admissions process would form wherein any and all
considerations of race, invidious or benign, are outlawed." 9 But will
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Grutter, 539 U.S. at 375-76 (Thomas, J., concurring).
212.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342-43 (citing Nathanson & Bartnik, supra note 190, at
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substituting colorblindness preserve the supposed gained equality?
Probably not.
Colorblindness denies the historical context of white superiority and
minority subordination. 220
By ignoring how the past shaped racial
distinctions, we remain imprisoned by the past by denying its influence in
the present.221 Our nation's history of racial hostility continues to inform
the perception and attitudes of persons empowered to act upon prejudiced
notions, thus, our historical background is relevant.222 A historical analysis
of equal protection, such as colorblindness, conceal the existence of
racially flawed social systems and the harms that result from silent
acceptance of the status quo and, thus, strip political significance from race
altogether.22 3 Human beings living in a society in which history, ideology,
law and patterns of social, economic, and political distribution have made
race salient, cannot be colorblind. 224 A colorblind approach is ineffective
because it provides neither a framework for enabling people to recognize
the effects of race on their perceptions and judgments, nor the tools
required to help them counteract those effects.225
Consequently,
colorblindness may only be a way to forget the racism in American
society, 226 not a way of eliminating it. In other words, as Justice Brennan
stated in Bakke: "we cannot ... let colorblindness become myopia which
makes the reality that many 'created equal' have been treated within our
lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by their fellow citizens., 227 It is
likely that implementing colorblindness upon an existing racial caste
system developed because of racial discrimination against racial minorities

context in which race is used. Hernandez, supra note 93, at 139 (citing Aleinikoff, supra
note 58, at 1063).
220. Hernandez, supra note 93, at 140.
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(arguing if society rejects the responsibility to re-make race, then we will die in denial, in
the tomb of race).
222. Hernandez, supra note 93, at 144.
223. Id. See also Feldman, supra note 20, at 154 (stating colorblindness is at best
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Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1253, 1277 (1998).
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BLACK L.J. 1,81 (1993)).
227. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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will continue imbalanced treatment of whites and minorities.22 8 This is
because colorblindness makes no distinction between race-conscious harm
to subordinate populations and race-conscious approaches to address the
subordination.2 2 Therefore, adopting colorblindness subtly accepts the
current structures of racial privilege 230 that we are trying to eradicate.
Colorblindness probably will not preserve equality, thus, the aspiration of
instilling colorblindness is inaccurate at this time and in the near future. If
instilling colorblindness results in inequality, then the goal of
colorblindness must succumb to equal protection's other original purpose:
remedying past discrimination in order to protect minorities and provide for
equality.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Grutter Court's paradoxical and faulty reasoning creates an
opinion replete with self-contradictory and inaccurate statements.
Diversity is established as a compelling interest justifying race-conscious
admissions programs. Furthermore, the Court describes diversity in a
manner making it clear that diversity is a continual, non-time sensitive
interest. Regardless of what the Court said about diversity, however, the
Court then prescribes that any government use of race must eventually
cease. The Court then incorrectly describes the Fourteenth Amendment's
purpose and equal protection's historical norm. Then, after essentially not
mentioning whether or not remedying past discrimination against
minorities can justify race-conscious admissions programs, the Court uses
the remedial affect of such programs to determine when they should cease.
The Court's conclusion that it expects racial preferences will no
longer be necessary in twenty-five years is more of a wish than a legal
conclusion.2 3 ' Justice Marshall's poignant words from fifteen years ago
apply today to Grutter's termination date for race-conscious admissions
programs:
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In constitutionalizing its wishful thinking, the majority today does
a grave disservice

. . .

to those victims of past and present racial

discrimination.., whom government has sought to assist .... 232

232.

J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 552-53 (Marshall, J. dissenting).

